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Abstract 
The development of discursive knowledge presumes the communication of meaning as 
analytically different from the communication of information. Knowledge can then be 
considered as a meaning which makes a difference. Whereas the communication of 
information is studied in the information sciences and scientometrics, the communication 
of meaning has been central to Luhmann’s attempts to make the theory of autopoiesis 
relevant for sociology. Analytical techniques such as semantic maps and the simulation 
of anticipatory systems enable us to operationalize the distinctions which Luhmann 
proposed as relevant to the elaboration of Husserl’s “horizons of meaning” in empirical 
research: interactions among communications, the organization of meaning in 
instantiations, and the self-organization of interhuman communication in terms of 
symbolically generalized media such as truth, love, and power. Horizons of meaning, 
however, remain uncertain orders of expectations, and one should caution against 
reification from the meta-biological perspective of systems theory. 
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Introduction 
 
The communication of meaning as different from the communication of information can 
perhaps be considered as the differentia specifica of social systems. Whereas biological 
systems are sometimes able to provide meaning to information and thus shape a semantic 
domain (Maturana, 1978; Maturana & Varela, 1980), and human minds can reflexively 
change the meaning of information, the capacity to communicate both information and 
meaning can be considered as an evolutionary achievement in inter-human languaging 
(Luhmann, 2002). When meaning can be communicated, this communication can further 
be codified and discursive knowledge also developed.  
 
The issue is beset with conceptual difficulties. First, the distinction between information 
and meaning can be conflated by defining information in terms insufficiently independent 
from meaning: as “meaningful information” or, in Bateson’s (1972: 489) formulation, as 
“a difference which makes a difference.” Shannon-type information is defined as a series 
of differences (in a probability distribution), whereas such differences can only make a 
next-order difference for a receiving (or observing) system that is able to provide the 
information with meaning. Secondly, “meaning” in the sociological tradition is often 
considered primarily as a subjective category and is not sufficiently understood in terms 
of inter-subjective communication.  
 
Third, the distinction between the communication of meaning and the communication of 
knowledge needs further elaboration. I shall argue that knowledge can be considered as 
“a meaning which makes a difference,” whereas meaning is generated when first-order 
differences (Shannon-type information) make a difference for a receiving system. 
However, the communication of knowledge requires the relative closure of the discourse 
in terms of specific codes of communication.  
 
These issues and distinctions are particularly salient nowadays, given the emergence of a 
knowledge-based economy (Foray, 2004; Leydesdorff, 2006a). Unlike a political 
economy, which can be considered as based on interactions among (i) economic 
exchange relations and (ii) political arrangements, the additional dynamics of (iii) 
knowledge-based communication requires the structural organization of the sciences 
(Whitley, 1984; Dasgupta & David, 1984). A third structured subdynamics can then be 
added to inter-human communication at the level of society. This third subdynamics 
potentially disturbs the relative stabilization of political economies in nations and tends to 
globalize and meta-stabilize existing market relations (Leydesdorff & Zawdie, 2010). 
 
The distinction between information and meaning 
 
Shannon (1948, at p. 3) provided a lucid distinction of meaning from information at the 
beginning of his paper entitled A Mathematical Theory of Communication: 
 
Frequently the messages have meaning; that is, they refer to or are correlated 
according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These 
semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The 
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significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible 
messages. 
 
Two systems of reference are distinguished in this quotation: the formal one of the 
electrical engineer or, in other words, Shannon himself as a mathematician, and the 
possible meanings provided by substantive discourses. Shannon considers the latter as 
irrelevant for the definition of information, but he notes the significance of potentially 
different selection mechanisms.  
 
Shannon-type information is defined as yet content-free (Theil, 1972). This condition of 
“still-to-be-provided-with-meaning” by a system of reference is also manifested in the 
units of measurement (e.g., bits of information) which are dimensionless. Shannon-type 
information does not yet contain meaning other than the mathematical definition of the 
expected information value contained as uncertainty in a message as a finite series of 
differences—in other words, a probability distribution. What the expected information 
content of the distribution means can only be defined by an observing system using its 
own selection mechanism. Meaning is defined “in use” (Wittgenstein, 1953). Note that 
selection by an observing system is deterministic and system-specific, whereas variation 
can be stochastic. 
 
The meaning provided to the (Shannon-type) information can sometimes reduce 
uncertainty. Reduction of uncertainty can be measured as negentropy (Brillouin, 1962): 
this possibility originates from the difference which the difference (or a series of 
differences, that is, a probability distribution) can make for a receiving system. Thus, “a 
difference which makes a difference” (Bateson, 1972) can also reduce the uncertainty 
that prevails and be identified as meaningful or observed information, given the 
specification of a system of reference.  
 
Weaver (1949, at p. 116) noted that Shannon’s abstract definition of information as 
uncertainty might sound “bizarre,” but that this level of abstraction might also be needed 
to develop a theory of meaning. Meaning is generated in use by specific systems that are 
able to receive and/or process meaning. This receiving system, however, does not have to 
be an observer, but can also be a discourse. Information is then provided with meaning 
which may contain a supra-individual and coordinating function. In other words, the 
meaning is codified among human beings, that is, at the intersubjective level. 
 
The systems-theoretical tradition has focused on the observer as the individual unit of 
analysis (e.g., Edelman, 1989). For example, Von Foerster (1979) ascribed to Maturana 
as his “Theorem Number One” that “Anything said is said by an observer,” and added his 
own corollary that “Anything said is said to an observer.” He concluded that the two 
observers share a language. From this perspective, however, language is considered only 
as a meta-biological domain.  
 
Maturana (1978, at p. 49), for example, noted that for an observer a “second-order 
consensual domain […] becomes indistinghuishable from a semantic domain.” However, 
understanding in language (as both an observer and a participant; Giddens, 1979) was set 
aside by him as the language of a human “super-observer” (pp. 58f.). From this biological 
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perspective, languaging—linguistic behavior—can be observed. The dynamics of human 
language as different from communication among insects cannot properly be analyzed 
from these meta-biological perspectives (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). 
 
Human language—and more generally, communication—connects not only observers, 
but also their observational reports, that is, the translation of their observations into 
communication provides the messaging with intersubjective meaning, and this 
codification allows for the communication of subjective meaning at the supra-individual 
level (Mead, 1934; Pask, 1975). Distinguishing the observational reports in language 
from the observers making these “utterances”1 moves us from the realm of mathematical 
biology and psychology into the sociological realm of communication as interhuman, that 
is, meaningful and potentially knowledge-based coordination.  
 
Language and symbolic mediation 
 
Meaning is generated in a system when different pieces of information are related as 
messages to one another, for example, as words in sentences (Hesse, 1988; Law & 
Lodge, 1984). The information is then positioned in a network with an emerging (and 
continuously reconstructed) structure. This positioning can be done by an individual 
who—as a system of reference—can provide personal meaning to the events, but 
meaning can also be provided at the supra-individual level, for example, in a discourse. 
In the latter case, meaning is discursive, and its dynamics can therefore be expected to be 
different from those of psychological meaning. 
 
Whereas a psychological identity can be expected to strive to integrate a plurality of 
meanings that could be provided to single events (for example, in order to avoid 
“cognitive dissonance”), the social system—as a dividuum (Fuchs, 1998, at pp. 225 ff.; 
cf. Latour, 2002; Nietzsche, 1878: I, §57)—can tolerate the entertainment of different 
meanings, and has the additional option to differentiate itself into subsystems which 
codify these meanings differently. This plurality in rationalities can be functional to the 
processing of complexity in a pluriform society (cf. Boudon, 1979; Bourdieu, 2004).  
 
For example, politicians and economists can discuss “shortages of energy” although 
among physicists “energy” is considered as a conserved quantity. Codifications facilitate 
and speed up the communication by making the communication system-specific. At the 
market, for example, one can simpy pay the price of something without having to 
negotiate. The price codifies the value of the commodity. Prices make it possible to 
abstract from the underlying values in another semantic domain (for example, that of 
banking). 
 
This possibility of functional differentiation in the codes of communication and the 
potentially symbolic generalization of meaning was first elaborated in the tradition of 
                                                 
1 Luhmann ([1984], 1995) defined communication in terms of three elements: (1) utterance, (2) 
information, and (3) understanding. Such a definition, in my opinion, does not distinguish sufficiently 
between communication among animals (e.g., insects) and human beings (Leydesdorff, 2006b). Luhmann’s 
theory can be considered as unnecessarily non- or even anti-humanistic (Leydesdorff, 2000, 2010c). 
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social-systems theory by the sociologists Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann. Building 
on Durkheim’s argument that norms function as integrative at the supra-individual level, 
Parsons theorized the possibility of functional differentiation among the roles of agents in 
different subsystems of society. According to Parsons (e.g., 1961, at p. 41), collectivities 
of roles can complement one another in fulfilling various functions in society. However, 
Parsons himself did not make a connection to what I consider as his other major 
contribution, namely, the theory of the symbolic generalization of the media of 
communication (Parsons, 1968). In his scheme, differentiation remains confined to four 
major meta-biologically derived functions (adaptation, goal-attainment, integration, and 
latency).  
 
Following Merton (1957), Luhmann ([1984], 1995) historicized social functions and 
proposed that they develop as specific rationalities in the different and historically 
variable processings of meaning in social subsystems. Luhmann added the evolutionary 
perspective that new forms of codification can be invented; for example, at first coins 
were used, then banknotes, and much later credit cards. Each communication subsystem 
develops further by overwriting and repositioning the previous versions of its coding.  
 
The prime example of this cultural evolution of communication has been provided by 
Kuhn’s (1962) notion of paradigm shifts. “Phlogiston,” for example, was backgrounded 
in scholarly discourse once “oxygen” was constructed as a new concept (Priestly, 1774-
1777). The new paradigm (in chemistry) opened domains for puzzle-solving and further 
communication with a code that is different from the previous one. However, both 
“oxygen” and “phlogiston” use a code of communication very different from exchange 
processes on the market, which obey economic mechanisms of exchange. Analogously, 
the truth of a scientific statement is different from the religious truth of a dogma. Other 
dimensions of interhuman communication (e.g., affection, power) always also play a role, 
although the institutional setting may facilitate the functionality of specific codes among 
these symbolically generalized media more than others. For example, it is transgressive to 
favour one scientific theory over another for political reasons, or to bribe a judge.  
 
Interhuman communication can thus be considered as a fabric woven in many directions: 
each communication can be provided with meaning in terms of power (Foucault, 1966), 
economic utility, affection, scientific truth, etc. These latent dimensions of 
communication resound and operate selectively in all interhuman communication. 
However, in specific communications some selections can be expected to operate more 
strongly than others because of the functionality of coding. Symbolically generalized 
codes enable us to be specific in our communications and thus to process more 
complexity. 
 
The selecting codes of communication are not a given, but enacted and reconstructed in 
use as the culturally and therefore supra-individually constructed dimensions of 
communication. Historically, the gradual disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire at the 
end of the Middle Ages, first in the Investiture Contest and then during the Reformation, 
generated an additional degree of freedom in which the prevailing form of differentiation 
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among the codes was changed from a hierarchical (stratified) one to another in which the 
codes could be reconstructed more freely as a function of the communication.  
 
The tight coupling between institutions and functions could then gradually be loosened to 
the extent that institutions could also be reorganized in terms of their functions. For 
example, during the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century and after the trial of Galileo, 
scientific truth could be differentiated from religious truth. Analogously, the trias 
politica—developed during the 18th century (Montesquieu, 1748)—regulates the 
differentiation among political discourses in modern constitutions. This functional 
differentiation in the communication has been institutionalized in national constitutions 
since the American and French Revolutions. 
 
Herbert Simon (1973) hypothesized that any evolving system can be expected to operate 
with an alphabet. Thus, one might hypothesize 20+ symbolically generalized media of 
communication possible in interhuman communications. These codes of communication 
should not be reified: they are historically constructed and enacted bottom-up in 
interhuman communications, but as they are reconstructed recursively over time, they can 
be expected to function as control mechanisms at the level of society that enable us to 
enrich our communication by allowing for greater precision. Note that the “top” or next-
order level is not yet defined or fixed in terms of these bottom-up (re)construction 
processes. 
 
The codes operate as selection mechanisms by enabling us to focus the communication. 
Selection mechanisms can reinforce one another in processes of mutual shaping 
(McLuhan, 1964). Thus, selection mechanisms can be expected to shape historical 
trajectories that are relatively stable (for example, in institutions). A next-order selection 
may drive a local stabilization into global meta-stabilization, or into regimes which 
function with dynamics that differ from—since they counteract as feedback mechanisms 
on—the dynamics of historical developments. Such further differentiation among 
selection mechanisms (stabilization and globalization) can uncouple the communication 
reflexively from the historical process in which it emerges. 
 
For example, communication with money first speeds up the communication on the 
market to the extent that local forms of capitalism can be shaped. Bank notes, stock 
exchanges, and credit cards provide means for worldwide transactions with 
correspondingly increasing speeds and precision. Marx already identified this emerging 
mechanism in capitalism as “alienating.” Luhmann ([1984], 1995) proposed to study the 
dynamics of communication (cf. Marx’s “exchange value”) as analytically different from 
the dynamics of human or group behavior (“use value”). The systems of reference are 
altered by the change of perspective caused by the newly emerging code of 
communication. This potential globalization is an attribute of the communication and not 
of the communicators.  
 
In the terminology of autopoiesis theory (Maturana & Varela, 1980), the two dynamics of 
processing meaning—at the level of agency and at the social level—remain “structurally 
coupled” and “interpenetrate” each other reflexively (Luhmann, 2002). However, one can 
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expect the cybernetics of communication to be different from the dynamics of human 
(group) behavior. Communications, for example, can travel worldwide without the 
communicators as carriers having to move. 
 
Horizons of meaning 
 
Interhuman communication is based on interactions among both communicators and 
communications. The meanings interact in a non-linear dynamics which is not hardwired 
and therefore no longer necessarily subject to the second law of thermodynamics. The 
redundancies generated by the processing of meaning, for example, can structure and 
reconstruct the information processing from the perspective of hindsight. The possibility 
of such non-linear dynamics is enabled by language as an evolutionary achievement: 
meaning can proliferate discursively at a speed much faster than its instantiations in 
language (e.g., in fantasies and wishes; cf. Weinstein and Platt, 1969) because of the 
possible feed-forward loops between individual experiences and expectations, and 
communication in language.  
 
Whereas the biological autopoiesis processes the history of the communications in terms 
of their structural sediments—for example, in terms of differentiations among organs or 
species—the orientation toward horizons of possible communication is provided by the 
additional communication of meaning in language. The linguistically or symbolically 
mediated communication channels are changed by the historical communication in terms 
of the communications possible thereafter. In other words, redundancies—sets of 
possibilities—are generated. Unlike the biological autopoiesis of the living (Maturana & 
Varela, 1980), meaning can be communicated reflexively and with reference to and in 
anticipation of “horizons of meaning.” I use the plural of this Husserlian concept in order 
to emphasize that one can expect the horizons of meaning to be structured by 
symbolically generalized codes of communication.  
 
Luhmann (1986) criticized Schultz’s (1932; 1953) interpretation of Husserl’s 
phenomenology because of the emphasis on observable instantiations of the cybernetics 
of behavior in the life-world (cf. Habermas, 1981; Habermas & Luhmann, 1971).  
Husserl himself had formulated his philosophy as a “transcendental phenomenology” 
with an emphasis on expectations (as different from observations). From the perspective 
of hindsight, this focus on intentions, meanings, and expectations can be considered as 
“mathematical” in the sense that it enables us to intuit other possible dimensions which 
resound in the empirical events that have happened to occur historically (Derrida, 1974; 
Heidegger, 1962; Husserl, [1935/6] 1962). We have no access to the possible other than 
by placing what exists reflexively between brackets. Husserl used the Greek word epochè 
( ’εποχη) for this “suspension” of all judgments about the existence of an external world. 
 
The analytical specification of expectations before proceeding to actual observations 
enables us to specify whether observed differences (variation) can be considered as 
significant. This is formalized, for example, in the chi-square test of statistical 
significance using a theory of measurement. Husserl (1935/6) noted that the positivistic 
focus on observables had eroded this basis of the modern sciences, and that one should 
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instead return to the reflexive position of Descartes, but reconstruct it in order to ground 
the social sciences in reflexivity. 
 
Not incidentally, therefore, Husserl (1929) called the book in which he explained his 
intersubjective “horizons of meaning” Cartesian Meditations. Husserl’s reference is to 
Descartes’ distinction between res extensa and res cogitans. The Cartesian Cogito knows 
him/herself as uncertain and different from the external world. In this act of doubt, the 
contingent Cogito finds the transcendent environment as the Other or a personal God. 
However, Husserl doubted this next step: the cogitatum of the Cogito is not necessarily 
God, but can also be considered as an intersubjective domain to which we all have 
personal access: the horizons of meaning that we share (to different extents). This domain 
is not in the res extensa, but remains res cogitans. In other words, the meaning that we 
provide to the events does not “exist” physically, but incurs on us as one among a set of 
culturally possible meanings. 
 
In the social sciences—as in the other theoretical sciences—one can use models to 
specify the expectations. The specification of expectations makes future states available 
in the present as potentially meaningful. The model—as different from the individual 
intuition—enables us to communicate about these future states with greater precision by 
invoking the symbolic codes of scholarly discourse. A model thus is part of discursive 
knowledge; it can be improved by argumentative contributions. However, this providing 
of new meaning is highly codified; only those who understand the model can contribute 
meaningfully. The model enables these participants to entertain a communication among 
specialists in which further knowledge can be developed and exchanged. In other words, 
the model is part of a communicative reality. 
 
This communicative reality that the communicators shape over time and reflexively 
reconstruct cannot be considered as res extensa, but belongs to the res cogitans; it is not 
stable like matter, but remains in flux like language. It enables us to communicate in 
terms of uncertainties (e.g., possibly relevant questions) and expectations. Husserl (1929) 
recognized this realm as cogitatum, that is, the substance about which the Cogito remains 
uncertain. Our mental predicates provided to the world in intersubjective exchanges with 
intentional human beings, shape our culture and therewith ground what Husserl also 
called a “concrete ontology” or, in other words, “a universal philosophy of science” 
(1929, at p. 159).  
 
This philosophy of science enables us to understand scientific models and concepts as 
specifically coded meanings that we attribute to an external reality at the intersubjective 
level. Note that from this perspective, the external world is not a social construct as in 
post-modernism; it is a cognitively hypothesized and highly codified construct that can be 
accessed reflexively and perhaps partly reconstructed by individual agency, but only in 
terms of further communications. In the res extensa, resources can be mobilized (for 
example, at the institutional level), but such policies can succeed only insofar as they 
enable us to access, deconstruct, and reconstruct the self-organization of cultural 
constructs in the res cogitans. 
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The models and not the modeled substance shape the sciences as cultural artifacts. 
According to Husserl’s (1935) The Crisis of the European Sciences, however, an 
empiristic self-understanding prevails in the modern sciences. In order to move the social 
sciences forward, one has to stay with the transcendental that one can retrieve in one’s 
self and thus recognize the sciences as part and parcel of a realm of cultural expectations 
that can be communicated. The “naturally” observed or perceived at the individual level 
is shaped by and rewritten in a realm of intersubjective expectations and their possible 
communication. Note that this res cogitans is also res, that is, real, and thus a possible 
subject of empirical investigation. The predictions on the basis of the models, for 
example, can be expected to feed back (e.g., technologically) on our material life. 
 
The structuration of expectations 
 
The scientific model as an exchange mechanism of cognitive expectations can provide us 
with a heuristics to understand the communication of other, for example, normative 
expectations. Normative exchanges can be expected to shape, for example, political 
discourse. In political discourse, events are provided with meanings that differ from those 
given be scientific discourse. In other words, social order is not a given, but a set of 
variously codified expectations that interact and self-organize in the res cogitans. This 
order of expectations can be sustained by institutions which function as instantiations 
(Giddens, 1984). Political discourse, for example, can be focused in a parliamentary 
debate, whereas scholarly discourse can be retrieved in scientific journals. The complex 
and internally differentiated order of expectations remains latent; the instantiations can be 
considered as their co-variations at specific moments of time. 
 
The codes can be considered as the latent dimensions that structure the discourses in 
analytically different directions. Two levels can be distinguished in this structuration: the 
codes operate as the internal axes of meaning-providing structures. This operation is 
recursive: meaning is provided to the information contained in the events, and meaning 
can further be codified—that is, provided with symbolic meaning—in the 
communication. Under the condition of functional differentiation the axes can be 
expected to span horizons of meanings in increasingly orthogonal directions. Some codes 
can in a next selection be generalized symbolically or, from the perspective of their 
stabilization along trajectories, be globalized as horizons of meaning that feed back on 
the local meaning processing in interhuman communication. 
 
Luhmann (1986) provided a thorough elaboration of Husserl’s concept of 
“intersubjectivity” in sociological terms. Three levels were distinguished in the 
communication of meaning: (i) local interactions, (ii) organization of meaning in 
historical instances, and (iii) the self-organization of the codes of communication. In 
modern, pluriform societies self-organization in different directions can be expected to 
prevail—communications are no longer coordinated at the center—while in pre-modern 
societies communication was organized in terms of institutions. Organization integrates, 
while self-organization tends to differentiate the functions of the communication. 
Organization operates at specific moments of time—according to Luhmann (2000), by 
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making decisions—and self-organization of meaning operates over time as codification in 
fluxes of communication.  
 
The two cybernetic mechanisms of organization (integration at interfaces) and self-
organization (differentiation of codes) can be considered as the woof and warp of the 
evolution of the cogitatum in a multidimensional space. This evolutionary development is 
driven bottom-up by variation in the interactions, while the codes operate in terms of 
selection mechanisms. For example, economic exchanges are organized in terms of local 
markets, but can self-organize a global market equilibrium if left sufficiently free to do 
so. Scientific communication is organized within communities and institutions, but these 
communities compete in hypothesizing and following the dynamics at the level of 
scientific fields (Bourdieu, 1976, 2004). Love and affection can be organized in terms of 
marriages, but also otherwise (Luhmann, 1982). Organization of meaning is historically 
contingent.  
 
The factor model and latent semantic analysis 
 
Functionally differentiated codes of communication cannot be observed directly, but their 
operations can be reconstructed reflexively as latent variables. Not incidentally, it was 
Paul Lazarsfeld, Merton’s colleague at Columbia University, who first made the 
connection between the latency of communication and the factor model. A 
communication network can be rewritten as a matrix. The matrix representation of this 
network allows us to decompose the main dimensions of a communication system using 
factor analysis. In other words, the network is composed in terms of relations, but it 
contains a structure (technically, a so-called “eigenstructure”) in which every relation can 
be positioned. Factor analysis enables us to investigate this latent structure in terms of the 
so-called eigenvectors of the matrix. 
 
For example, words can be considered as meaningful information when they are placed in 
relation to one another in sentences. The sentences can be expected to contain meaning 
because information is specifically related. (Note that this can also be done by an 
observer, but my focus here is on language as communication.) A textual unit can be 
provided with specific meanings, for example, in scholarly, political or other discourses. 
The symbolically generalized codes operate as next-order selection mechanisms shaping, 
for example, paradigms. Three selection mechanisms can thus be hypothesized as 
operating in parallel: a first one positioning the relational information in an observing 
system (at each moment), a second one coding meaning in potentially different directions 
(over time), and a third one potentially globalizing the stabilizations of meaning in terms 
of different codes of communication (Lucio-Arias and Leydesdorff, 2009a). 
 
At first, this problem may seem intractable: when both the variations and the (factorial) 
structures change over time, one obtains a system of partial differential equations with no 
easy solution. However, the problem can be decomposed. The factor model can bring 
latent dimensions into view. By reorganizing the data in this multi-dimensional space, 
one can draw a semantic map in terms of the observables (e.g., words). The organizing 
 10
principles (that is, the dimensions) remain latent, but can, for example, be penciled into 
the map. 
 
Figure 1: Semantic map among 56 title words connected at cosine ≥ 0.1 among 149 titles 
of documents in Social Science Information 2005-2009.  
 
Figure 1, for example, shows a semantic map using the title words of 149 documents 
which were published in Social Science Information during the period 2005-2009. In 
these titles, 69 words occurred three or more times, of which 66 were related in the 
normalized word-document matrix 2 at a level of cosine > 0.1.3 Factor analysis of this 
word-document matrix enabled me to color the main dimensions into the map as shown 
here for the first three factors with red, green, and blue, respectively. (These first three 
factors explain in this case only 10.8% of the common variance). 
 
                                                 
2 The words were normalized using the observed/expected ratios instead of the raw data (Leydesdorff & 
Welbers, 2011). One can add the margin totals and grand sum to the word-document matrix and compute 
the expected value for each cell (eij) from the observed ones (oij) using 

i ijj
j iji ij
ij o
oo
e . The routine 
for generating these semantic maps can be found at http://www.leydesdorff.net/ti/index.htm. 
3 I use the non-parametric cosine instead of the Pearson correlation for the representation of the multi-
dimensional space (Salton & McGill, 1983; Ahlgren et al., 2003). All distributions are skewed because of 
the prevailing selection pressures.  
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Note that this is not a relational map as in social network or co-word analysis. The words 
“science” and “social,” for example, co-occur most strongly by far in this domain of 
titles, viz., 12 times. However, the similarity in the distributions of occurrences among 
“capital” and “trust” (which co-occur only four times) is much greater than that between 
“science” and “society”. In this dataset, the relation between “trust” and “capital” is more 
important—as a correlation in the semantic space of correlations—than the relation 
between “science” and “society.” Technically, this semantic space can also be called a 
vector space, as against the relational space of the observable network of relations. A 
vector space is generated when a network of relations is spanned from which an 
architecture necessarily emerges. 
 
One can take this reasoning one step further and also position the factors (or so-called 
“eigenvectors”) in the vector space. Figure 2 shows the result of this projection for the 
same data. The (orthogonally rotated) factor matrix is used as input to a network 
visualization program. (Negative factor loadings are indicated with dotted lines.4)  
 
 
Figure 2: Three-factor solution of 40 words in titles of 149 documents published in 
Social Science Information 2005-2009 (words with factor loadings between -0.1 and 0.1 
excluded; Fruchterman & Rheingold, 1991). 
 
                                                 
4 Factor loadings between -0.1 and +0.1 were suppressed (in SPSS) in order to enhance the visualization. 
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Figure 2 enables us to designate more easily the three specialties involved: Factor 1 
focuses on issues of organizational sociology, Factor 2 on ethnological studies, and 
Factor 3 on migration studies and the Mediterrenean. In other words, these clusters are 
reconstructed as representations of the three dominant repertoires publishing during this 
period in Social Science Information. Note that there are no positive correlations between 
Factor 1 and Factor 2. Between Factor 1 and Factor 3, however, the words “Role” and 
“Capital” provide articulation points; between Factors 2 and 3 the word “Ethology” is an 
articulation point between the star-formed graphs representing the discursive 
differentiation. The various discourses are organized within the context of this journal. 
 
The knowledge-based dynamics  
 
Factor analysis provides a static representation of the multi-dimensional space in an 
instantiation; in the case above, this was the aggregate of a five-year period. 
Dynamically, the next question is whether these factors of meaning organization are 
integrated into a single body of knowledge or whether differentiation is indicated. In the 
case of differentiation, a synergy can sometimes be found despite a lack of integration 
among the main dimensions. Thus, one can oppose coherence and synergy: coherence is 
an indicator of organization, and synergy an indicator of self-organization. Using this 
distinction, the variables (words) and structures (factors) are considered as a system, and 
thus a systemic measure is needed. 
 
Mutual information in three or more dimensions—sometimes called “configurational 
information”—can be used as an indicator of the potential synergy (e.g., Abramson, 
1963; Ashby, 1964; Jakulin, 2005; Leydesdorff & Sun, 2009; McGill, 1954; Ulanowicz, 
1986). Although this information measure is expressed in bits, it is not a Shannon-type 
information (Krippendorff, 2009; Yeung, 2008, at p. 59). However, Garner & McGill 
(1956, at p. 227) suggested that the information measure is more useful than the 
interaction variance which behaves similarly, but assumes a normal distribution.  
 
Both interaction variance and mutual information in three (or more) dimensions can be 
either positive or negative (Garner & McGill, 1956; Leydesdorff, 2010d). Negative 
values indicate a reduction of uncertainty at the systems level. This reduction cannot be 
expected historically (because the second law is equally valid for probabilistic entropy),5 
but has to be self-organized within the system against the axis of time. A decrease in 
uncertainty (that is, a negative value for this entropy) means that redundancy generated 
by evolutionary self-organization in the globally organized knowledge base is prevalent 
over the historical organization. Note that these are systems measures which cannot be 
attributed to individual components without using aggregation rules (Leydesdorff et al., 
2006; Leydesdorff & Fritsch, 2006; Theil, 1972). 
 
The mutual information among the three factors in the system of title words studied 
above was +50.6 millibits. The positive value indicates that the synergy among the three 
                                                 
5 The second law of thermodynamics holds equally for probabilistic entropy, since S = kB H and kB is a 
constant (the Boltzmann constant). Because of the constant, the development of S over time is a 
function of the development of H, and vice versa. 
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factors is not found in the historical organization and integration in the titles of the 
journal. When the analysis, however, is repeated for the 187 documents that cite one of 
the 149 documents published in Social Science Information, I obtain Figure 3, and mutual 
information in three dimensions of –106.2 millibits of information.6  
 
 
Figure 3: Three-factor solution of 40 words in the titles of 187 documents citing Social 
Science Information 2005-2009 (factor loadings between -0.1 and 0.1 excluded; 
Fruchterman & Rheingold, 1991). 
 
The citing articles belong to different literatures: Factor 1 indicates evolutionary 
theorizing, Factor 2 represents studies about technology and society, and Factor 3 studies 
about evolving systems. “Digital” and “Evidence” function as articulation points between 
Factors 2 and 3, and only “Approach” between Factors 1 and 3. Although these three 
citing literatures are not integrated, a synergy in their differentiation is indicated by the 
negative value of the mutual information in three dimensions (Lucio-Arias & 
Leydesdorff, 2009b).  
 
In other words, the evolutionary differentiation is reduced in the organizational 
integration of title words in Social Science Information. In addition to this organization, 
                                                 
6 Krippendorff’s (2009) information interaction measure IABC→AB:AC:BC was 120.0 mbits and 89.9 mbits for 
the original documents and the citing ones, respectively. Thus, the two sets are not so very different in this 
respect (Leydesdorff, 2010d). 
 14
the self-organization can be made visible in a map as differentiation because it is 
instantiated. However, the differentiation develops over time and has therefore to be 
measured algorithmically. The dynamic development of the virtual structure can thus be 
indicated using these information measures.  
changing configurations
of meaning
I. Observable human actions and 
inter-human interactions
II. latent structures organize different 
meanings into structural components;
positional meaning; significance
grouping; decomposition; 
data reduction
time
III. coding rules; reflexive meaning 
→self-organization of discursive knowledge 
structuration
structuring
 
Figure 4: A layered process of codification of information by the processing of meaning, 
and the codification of meaning in terms of discursive knowledge. (Adapted from 
Leydesdorff (2010a), at p. 405.) 
 
Figure 4 summarizes my argument hitherto. At the lowest level (I), one can use the 
results of measurements. For example, one may use data from questionnaires about what 
a stimulus means to respondents, or—closer to our example—relations among articles 
such as citations, co-authorship relations, or shared co-occurrences of words. The 
distributions of observable relations contain expected information about the social and 
intellectual structures operating upon this data. Organization reduces uncertainty in the 
data at each moment of time; self-organization generates an overlay of expectations that 
can feed back on the present and thus potentially reduce uncertainty within the system. 
 
The structuring of the information processing is provided by positioning the information 
as in a factor model (level II). Meaning is generated in the recursive relations among 
information contents. Structuration is provided in terms of (next-order) codes of 
communication (level III) which can be used to relate different meanings. Whereas the 
positioning of the information at level II takes place at each moment of time, 
structuration (at level III) is based on the development of the organizing structure over 
time. The operations over time can be structurating because the relevant data is structured 
at each moment of time. Structures are reproduced and modified along trajectories, and 
restructuring can be reinforced or counteracted upon at a next-order regime level. 
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The algorithmic model of meaning processing 
 
I noted above that meanings incur on events. In other words, events are understood from 
the perspective of hindsight, but with reference to possible future events. The time axis is 
thus a crucial dimension. It is often pictured as an arrow flying from the past via the 
present to the future, but the retrospective perspective of hindsight also operates in the 
processing of meaning, and thus time can be considered as yet another dimension or a 
degree of freedom. A model can provide us with a prediction about future states because 
it remains in a res cogitans in which future moments of time can be simulated in the 
present. 
 
The mathematical biologists Rosen (1985) defined as “anticipatory” a system that is able 
to entertain a model of itself. The model can provide the system with one or more 
representations of future states in the present. These representations can be used for the 
active reconstruction of the system. Dubois (2003, at pp. 112f.) further distinguished 
between weakly and strongly anticipatory systems: a system that is weakly anticipatory is 
able to use its predicted states at future times for adaptation or intervention, while a 
system which is strongly anticipatory can use its anticipated states at time t + 1, t + 2, 
etc., for its present reconstruction.  
 
Within this category of strongly anticipatory systems, Dubois (1998) further 
distinguished between incursive and hyper-incursive systems. Incursive systems use both 
their historical states and present or future states for their reconstruction, whereas hyper-
incursive systems operate exclusively on the basis of expectations. In Leydesdorff (2009, 
2010b), I described the cogitans as an embodied system that uses also historical states for 
the computation of a next one (in the present), whereas the social system or Husserl’s 
cogitatum uses only future states, that is, expectations and their organization in systems 
of expectation. Such hyper-incursive cybernetics would operate against the axis of time 
and thus reduce uncertainty. Note that this is not yet a system, but a mechanism which 
requires anchoring in historical time by other (incursive) mechanisms. 
 
As noted, a cogitatum cannot be instantiated without a cogitans to instantiate it; the two 
systems are structurally coupled and intertwined by reflexive interpenetration. Thus, there 
is always historical production of uncertainty in the “life-world” involved, but this 
forward arrow is counteracted by a feedback arrow from the self-organization of the 
codes. The latter is an evolutionary mechanism that operates in history, but against the 
arrow of time because redundancies are generated. 
 
A hyper-incursive system cannot exist and be observed in the res extensa. The definitions 
are analytical and should not be reified in an external world. In other words, these are 
relevant subdynamics for the specification of the dynamics of communication of meaning 
and knowledge. However, the domains to be studied from this perspective are very 
different from biological or even psychological ones (Giddens, 1979). For example, it 
could be shown (Leydesdorff & Franse, 2009)—using the logistic equation (which can be 
used for modeling processes of growth and decline in biology) and its equivalent 
formulation in the hyper-incursive domain—that the biological and sociological domains 
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are separated at the value of four of the so-called bifurcation parameter, and that this 
separatrix can only be crossed by invoking an incursive routine (that is, a psychological 
cogitans or human agency). 
 
This is not the place to repeat the derivation of the various equations (Leydesdorff, 2009, 
2010b). My crucial point is that the three cybernetic mechanisms specified by Luhmann 
can be operationalized as different mechanisms of incursion and hyper-incursion. When 
the various equations are solved, the conclusions are the following:  
 
Interaction—hyper-incursively modeled as the interaction of two mutually expected 
selection mechanisms: )1)(1( 11   ttt xxbx —leads to turn taking in the 
communication of meaning and thereby variation from the perspective of the social 
communication system. By extending this model parsimoniously only with a single 
(third) selection mechanism, one obtains two options which model self-organization and 
organization of meaning, respectively. When three anticipatory sources of variance can 
operate selectively upon one another, this might be modeled as follows:  
 
 )1)(1)(1( 111   tttt xxxcx  (1) 
 
Organization instantiates the interfaces historically, and one can analogously model this 
as follows:  
 
 )1)(1)(1( 11 tttt xxxdx    (2) 
 
The difference between the organization of meaning (Equation 2) and its self-
organization (Equation 1) is provided in the third term: is the processing bent back to the 
present, or does this term in the model remain a reference to a future state? Organization 
can reduce uncertainty by instantiation in the present.  
 
Equation 1 (modeling self-organization) has two imaginary roots and one real root. The 
real root can be considered as a constant operating in the coding. Equation 2 models a 
system (organization of meaning) that can be expected to perish after a finite number of 
historical instantiations. In other words, organizations of meaning emerge and disappear 
historically. Long-term stability is provided to the system meta-historically by the 
evolutionary mechanism of self-organization in the communication of meaning. The third 
mechanism—interaction—provides variation. Organization and self-organization are 
coupled to each other as Equations 1 and 2, but the results of these two mechanisms 
operating provide different solutions.  
 
Conclusion: society as not a system 
 
The metaphors of systems theory have been tainted by the biological discourse from 
which they emerged. Unlike biological systems, however, a social system cannot exist; 
the various cybernetics reconstruct orders of expectations that can be accessed 
reflexively. In an email conversation, Krippendorff (June 9, 2010; at 
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https://hermes.gwu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind1006&L=cybcom&F=&S=&P=1565) 
suggested to distinguish between systems theory as a meta-biological generalization and 
the specification of cybernetic mechanisms for explaining social order and 
communication in language.  
 
For example, the metaphor of “self-organization” suffers from the biological origins of 
this theorizing (Maturana & Varela, 1980). The “self” needs quotation marks because an 
order of expectations cannot be expected to contain an identifiable self; it remains an 
order of distributions that operate on one another. Luhmann ([1984], 1995), for example, 
proposed distinguishing among the social, the temporal, and the substantive as three 
dimensions in which these distributions can be extended (Latour, 2002). The 
uncertainties contained in the distributions can over time be considered as expectations. 
Thus, the modeling of the communication of meaning and information is deeply 
entrenched. 
 
My insistence on specifying expectations in the social sciences is not meant to imply that 
sociology is an impossible—since non-empirical—science about non-observables. 
Uncertainties can be hypothesized, and we explored the various mechanisms that can be 
specified with reference to expectations. The specification of expectations enriches the 
research design beyond a behaviouristic focus on agency and institutions. Understanding 
and interpretation of language and knowledge require reflexive communication. 
 
These cybernetic mechanisms need to be specified in a mathematical language that is yet 
content-free such as the language of information theory and cybernetics, since otherwise 
one is easily deluded by the biological or sometimes psychological connotations of the 
metaphors. One is in need of fresh metaphors, such as Giddens’ (1979) notion of 
“structuration” (Leydesdorff, 2010b). Sociology becomes fundamentally different from 
biology and psychology as soon as one begins to focus on the communication of meaning 
and knowledge. In this context, one should remember Luhmann’s dictum that society is 
not made up of human beings, but constructed in terms of their communications 
(Luhmann, 1996; cf. Marx [1858], 1973, at p. 265).  
 
Unfortunately, in some of his later writing Luhmann (e.g., 1997) departed from these 
sociological assumptions and succumbed to the attraction of developing a general theory 
of observation. This is countrary to the sociological project, in my opinion, because a 
meta-biological assumption is introduced (Habermas, 1987; Leydesdorff, 2006b and 
2010c). Following these later writings of Luhmnann, one would leave the deeply 
humanistic appeal which transpires from Husserl’s philosophy in favour of considering 
the social as an automaton in which the Greek gods operate in the disguise of 
“performative media of communication.”  
 
I have wished to argue that symbolically generalized media of communication codify our 
expectations and thereby empower our performances reflexively in terms of handling 
complexity in terms of expectations. Performance, however, remains an attribute of 
human agency. The reflexive understanding of horizons of meaning made possible by 
communication provides us with access to a social reality in which knowledge-based 
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anticipations play an increasing role. The (self-)organization of meaning at the above-
individual level no longer “structurates” only our actions (Giddens, 1979, 1984), but 
more importantly our expectations.  
 
References: 
Abramson, N. (1963). Information Theory and Coding. New York, etc.: McGraw-Hill. 
Ahlgren, P., Jarneving, B., & Rousseau, R. (2003). Requirement for a Cocitation 
Similarity Measure, with Special Reference to Pearson's Correlation Coefficient. 
Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 54(6), 
550-560. 
Ashby, W. R. (1964). Constraint analysis of many-dimensional relations. General 
Systems Yearbook, 9, 99-105. 
Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballantine. 
Boudon, R. (1979). La logique du social. Paris: Hachette. 
Bourdieu, P. (1976). Le champ scientifique. Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 
2(2), 88-104. 
Bourdieu, P. (2004). Science of Science and Reflexivity. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Brillouin, L. (1962). Science and Information Theory. New York: Academic Press. 
Dasgupta, P., & David, P. (1994). Towards a new economics of science. Research Policy, 
23(5), 487-522. 
Derrida, J. (1974). Edmund Husserl’s origine de la géometrie. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France. 
Dubois, D. M. (1998). Computing Anticipatory Systems with Incursion and 
Hyperincursion. In D. M. Dubois (Ed.), Computing Anticipatory Systems, CASYS-
First International Conference (Vol. 437, pp. 3-29). Woodbury, NY: American 
Institute of Physics. 
Dubois, D. M. (2003). Mathematical Foundations of Discrete and Functional Systems 
with Strong and Weak Anticipations. In M. V. Butz, O. Sigaud & P. Gérard 
(Eds.), Anticipatory Behavior in Adaptive Learning Systems (Lecture Notes in 
Artificial Intelligence Vol. 2684, pp. 110-132). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Edelman, G. M. (1989). The remembered present: a biological theory of consciousness. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Foray, D. (2004). The Economics of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press. 
Foucault, M. (1966). Les mots et les choses: archéologie des sciences humaines. Paris: 
Gallimard. 
Fruchterman, T., & Reingold, E. (1991). Graph drawing by force-directed replacement. 
Software—Practice and Experience, 21, 1129-1166. 
Fuchs, P. (1998). Das Unbewußte in Psychoanalyse und Systemtheorie. Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp. 
Garner, W. R., & McGill, W. J. (1956). The relation between information and variance 
analyses. Psychometrika, 21(3), 219-228. 
Giddens, A. (1979). Central Problems in Social Theory. London, etc.: Macmillan. 
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Habermas, J. (1981). Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
 19
Habermas, J. (1987). Excursus on Luhmann's Appropriation of the Philosophy of the 
Subject through Systems Theory. In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: 
Twelve Lectures (pp. 368-385). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Habermas, J., & Luhmann, N. (1971). Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
Heidegger, M. (1962). Die Frage nach dem Ding. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. 
Hesse, M. (1980). Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science. 
London: Harvester Press. 
Husserl, E. (1929). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge [Cartesian 
meditations and the Paris lectures]. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. 
Husserl, E. ([1935/36] 1962). Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die 
Transzendentale Phänomenologie. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Jakulin, A. (2005). Machine learning based on attribute interactions (Vol. 
http://stat.columbia.edu/~jakulin/Int/jakulin05phd.pdf). Ljubljana: University of 
Ljubljana. 
Krippendorff, K. (2009). W. Ross Ashby’s information theory: a bit of history, some 
solutions to problems, and what we face today. International Journal of General 
Systems, 38(2), 189-212. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Latour, B. (2002). Gabriel Tarde and the end of the social. In P. Joyce (Ed.), The social in 
question: new bearings in history and the social sciences (pp. 117-132). London: 
Routledge. 
Law, J., & Lodge, P. (1984). Science for Social Scientists. London, etc.: Macmillan. 
Leydesdorff, L. (1994). Uncertainty and the Communication of Time. Systems Research, 
11(4), 31-51. 
Leydesdorff, L. (2000). Luhmann, Habermas, and the Theory of Communication. 
Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 17(3), 273-288. 
Leydesdorff, L. (2006a). The Knowledge-Based Economy: Modeled, Measured, 
Simulated. Boca Raton, FL: Universal Publishers. 
Leydesdorff, L. (2006b). The Biological Metaphor of a (Second-order) Observer and the 
Sociological Discourse. Kybernetes, 35(3/4), 531-546. 
Leydesdorff, L. (2009). The Non-linear Dynamics of Meaning-Processing in Social 
Systems. Social Science Information, 48(1), 5-33. 
Leydesdorff, L. (2010a). The Knowledge-Based Economy and the Triple Helix Model. 
Annual Review of Information Science and Technology, 44, 367-417. 
Leydesdorff, L. (2010b). The Communication of Meaning and the Structuration of 
Expectations: Giddens’ “Structuration Theory” and Luhmann’s “Self-
Organization”. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and 
Technology, 61(10), 2138-2150. 
Leydesdorff, L. (2010c). Luhmann Reconsidered: Steps towards an empirical research 
program in the sociology of communication. In C. Grant (Ed.), Beyond Universal 
Pragmatics: Essays in the Philosophy of Communication (pp. 149-173). Oxford 
Peter Lang. 
 20
Leydesdorff, L. (2010d). Redundancy in Systems which Entertain a Model of 
Themselves: Interaction Information and the Self-organization of Anticipation 
Entropy, 12(1), 63-79, 
Leydesdorff, L., Dolfsma, W., & Panne, G. v. d. (2006). Measuring the Knowledge Base 
of an Economy in terms of Triple-Helix Relations among 'Technology, 
Organization, and Territory'. Research Policy, 35(2), 181-199. 
Leydesdorff, L., & Franse, S. (2009). The Communication of Meaning in Social Systems. 
Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 26(1), 109-117. 
Leydesdorff, L., & Fritsch, M. (2006). Measuring the Knowledge Base of Regional 
Innovation Systems in Germany in terms of a Triple Helix Dynamics. Research 
Policy, 35(10), 1538-1553. 
Leydesdorff, L., & Sun, Y. (2009). National and International Dimensions of the Triple 
Helix in Japan: University-Industry-Government versus International Co-
Authorship Relations. Journal of the American Society for Information Science 
and Technology 60(4), 778-788. 
Leydesdorff, L., & Welbers, K. (2011). The semantic mapping of words and co-words in 
contexts. Journal of Informetrics, in press; doi:10.1016/j.joi.2011.1001.1008. 
Leydesdorff, L., & Zawdie, G. The triple helix perspective of innovation systems. 
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 22(7), 789-804. 
Lucio-Arias, D., & Leydesdorff, L. (2009a). The Dynamics of Exchanges and References 
among Scientific Texts, and the Autopoiesis of Discursive Knowledge. Journal of 
Informetrics, 3(2), 261-271. 
Lucio-Arias, D., & Leydesdorff, L. (2009b). An Indicator of Research Front Activity: 
Measuring Intellectual Organization as Uncertainty Reduction in Document Sets. 
Journal of the American Society for information Science and Technology, 60(12), 
2488-2498. 
Luhmann, N. (1982). Liebe als Passion. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
Luhmann, N. (1986). Intersubjektivität oder Kommunikation: Unterschiedliche 
Ausgangspunkte soziologischer Theoriebildung. Archivio di Filosofia, 54(1-3), 
41-60. 
Luhmann, N. (1995). Social Systems. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Luhmann, N. (1996). On the scientific context of the concept of communication. Social 
Science Information, 35(2), 257-267. 
Luhmann, N. (1997). Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt a.M.: Surhkamp. 
Luhmann, N. (2000). Organisation und Entscheidung. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Luhmann, N. (2002). How Can the Mind Participate in Communication? In W. Rasch 
(Ed.), Theories of Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity (pp. 
169–184). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Marx, K. ([1857] 1973). Grundrisse: foundations of the critique of political economy 
(rough draft) Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Maturana, H. R. (1978). Biology of language: the epistemology of reality. In G. A. Miller 
& E. Lenneberg (Eds.), Psychology and Biology of Language and Thought. 
Essays in Honor of Eric Lenneberg (pp. 27-63). New York: Academic Press. 
Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. (1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the 
Living. Boston: Reidel. 
 21
McGill, W. J. (1954). Multivariate information transmission. Psychometrika, 19(2), 97-
116. 
McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding Media: the Extension of Man. New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Mead, G. H. (1934). The Point of View of Social Behaviourism. In C. H. Morris (Ed.), 
Mind, Self, & Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist. Works of G. 
H. Mead (Vol. 1, pp. 1-41). Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Merton, R. K. (1957). Social theory and social structure, rev. ed. Glencoe, IL: The Free 
Press. 
Montesquieu, Charles de Sécondat, Baron de (1748). De l’esprit des lois. Paris. 
Nietzsche, F. (1878). Menschliches, allzumenschliches: ein Buch für freie Geister. 
Parsons, T. (1961). Theories of society: Foundations of modern sociological theory. New 
York: Free Press of Glencoe. 
Parsons, T. (1968). Interaction: I. Social Interaction. In D. L. Sills (Ed.), The 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Vol. 7, pp. 429-441). New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Pask, G. (1975). Conversation, Cognition and Learning. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Priestley, J. (1774-1777). Experiments and Observations on Different Kinds of Air. 
London. 
Rosen, R. (1985). Anticipatory Systems: Philosophical, mathematical and 
methodological foundations. Oxford, etc.: Pergamon Press. 
Salton, G., & McGill, M. J. (1983). Introduction to Modern Information Retrieval. 
Auckland, etc.: McGraw-Hill. 
Schutz, A. (1953). Die Phaenomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften (Ideas 
III by Edmund Husserl). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 13(4), 506-
514. 
Schütz, A. (1932). Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (G. Walsh & F. Lehnert, 
Trans. Vol. 1932). Vienna: Springer. 
Shannon, C. E. (1948). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Bell System 
Technical Journal, 27, 379-423 and 623-356. 
Simon, H. A. (1973). The Organization of Complex Systems. In H. H. Pattee (Ed.), 
Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge of Complex Systems (pp. 1-27). New York: 
George Braziller Inc. 
Theil, H. (1972). Statistical Decomposition Analysis. Amsterdam/ London: North-
Holland. 
Ulanowicz, R. E. (1986). Growth and Development: Ecosystems Phenomenology. San 
Jose, etc.: toExcel. 
Von Foerster, H. (1979). Cybernetics of Cybernetics. In K. Krippendorff (Ed.), 
Communication and Control in Society (pp. 5-8). New York: Gordon and Breach. 
Weaver, W. (1949). Some Recent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of 
Communication. In C. E. Shannon & W. Weaver (Eds.), The Mathematical 
Theory of Communication (pp. 93-117.). Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Weinstein, F., & Platt, G. M. (1969). The Wish to be Free: Society, Psyche, and Value 
Change. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Whitley, R. D. (1984). The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 22
 23
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. New York: Macmillan. 
Yeung, R. W. (2008). Information Theory and Network Coding. New York, NY: 
Springer. 
 
